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ABSTRACT 
Tawarruq is a form of revisionism that replaces the Islamic 
allocation criteria with conventional ones, while maintaining a 
symbolic badge of Islamic finance attached to the whole 
process.  It is unfortunate that the successful expansion of 
Islamic finance is accompanied with challenges that threaten 
to suffocate the whole process under the guise of financial 
innovation.   
In this paper, we intend to show that institutional Tawarruq 
falls outside the paradigm of Islamic finance.  Its use, if 
predominant, can be precipitous, leading to impose a 
conventional model onto Islamic finance and therefore could 
make it an exercise in futility.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Islamic finance has been introduced into a world of 
conventional finance.  The allocation of financial resources is 
done in the conventional world of finance according the rate of 
interest.  In addition, the volume of conventional finance is 
overwhelming and the use of the interest rate is prevalent.  
Islamic finance allocation introduces new criteria based on the 
use of financial resources to finance consumption and 
investment.  On the one hand, it provides fund owners with a 
share in the profits of the financial process.  On the other 
hand, it provides finance users with the goods and services 
they desire to obtain.   
The criteria of allocating financial resources applied by Islamic 
finance introduce real benefits to the economy both at the 
macro level and at the level of the financial sector itself. 
Tawarruq is a form of revisionism that replaces the Islamic 
allocation criteria with conventional ones, while maintaining a 
symbolic badge of Islamic finance attached to the whole 
process.  It is unfortunate that the successful expansion of 
Islamic finance is accompanied with challenges that threaten 
to suffocate the whole process under the guise of financial 
innovation.   
In this paper, we intend to show that institutional Tawarruq 
falls outside the paradigm of Islamic finance.  Its use, if 
predominant, can be precipitous, leading to impose a 
conventional model onto Islamic finance and therefore could 
make it an exercise in futility.   
The exposition relies on three previous publications by the 
author, which include a wider selection of references. 
The author is especially grateful for Dr. Mohammad Elgari for 
energetically launching an active discussion about the subject, 
for the Harvard Law School and the London School of 
Economics for organizing a seminar on the subject.  The 
author is especially grateful to Dr. Anas Zarka, Dr. Mahmoud 
El-Gamal, and Dr. M. Nejatullah Siddiqui for their critical 
comments on earlier draft.  As usual, the mistakes remain his. 
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 ISLAMIC FINANCE: SUCCESS 
AND CHALLENGES 
Islamic finance can be considered as the most important 
contribution to human civilization in the twentieth century, 
and the most important source of financial innovation in the 
twenty-first century.  It has proven a sound and practical way 
to revive ancient and long forgotten Jewish, Christian as well 
as Hindu and Buddhist teachings1.  However, Islamic finance 
has its subtleties.  The reason is that it draws its logic from 
both Fiqh and monetary and financial economics.  Fiqh is a 
discipline based on textual verification and analysis, while 
monetary and financial economics is a discipline based on 
deduction and induction.  Both disciplines are quite different 
in methodology to the extent it takes a big effort from a scholar 
trained in one discipline to gain substantial expertise into the 
other.  
Unfortunately, Shari'a scholars are at a great disadvantage in 
this regard, because they are not equipped to use economists’ 
tools of analysis.  Such tools distinguish economics from all 
other social sciences and place him much closer to physical 
sciences.  Meanwhile, some economists may tend to think that 
it is not an impossible task for economists to learn Fiqh 
methodology.  However, sufficient care must be exercised. 
Usually economists working in the field of Islamic finance, 
especially those well versed in Arabic are tempted to learn 
Fiqh, expecting to be able to play the role of both economics 
and Fiqh scholars.  Undoubtedly, some economists have been 
able to write professional papers in Fiqh and could have a 
robust debate with Shari'a scholars.  However, it would be 
difficult for Shari'a scholars to reciprocate.  While economic 
and Fiqh are equally difficult to learn, Economics appears as a 
much tougher discipline to outsiders than Fiqh.  The reason is 
that outsiders get the wrong impression that once they learned 
the texts of Qur’an and Hadith and their meaning, they 
become experts in Fiqh.  In fact they cannot learn all texts and 
1 Wayne and McIntosh (1998). 
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all what has been said about their meanings, which is a 
lifetime job.  They can learn only some texts related to few 
chosen topics and some of what has been said about their 
meaning.  To our opinion, such wrong impression stands 
behind the existence of many claiming-to-be Fiqh experts.  We 
believe that it is also the reason behind the existence of none-
economists, who pose as self-made Fiqh experts, without 
having any academic background in Fiqh.      
Economists, who are not well equipped in Arabic to the extent 
of being capable enough to handle classical texts, are well 
advised to keep their distance.  Even if they are masters of 
Arabic texts, they cannot be self-made Fiqh experts.  They 
would be like someone who reads some general books in 
economics and thinks that he can be a self-made economist.  
Anyone specialized in one discipline and ventures in another 
without having the right tools, may end with a cloudy view of 
both disciplines.  The unwary will face the fact that learning a 
methodology and practicing it influences one’s way of thinking.  
Learning two diagrammatically opposed methodologies, 
without taking extreme care could ultimately lead to one of 
them taking rein and the other setting back.   
While economists who venture into Fiqh will never become 
Shari'a scholars, unless they drop all what they are doing and 
embark upon Shari'a studies starting with Shari'a schools and 
ending with graduate studies in universities, while their life 
time is sufficiently long to allow such thing.  However, they 
may be able to master what Fiqh has to say about few specific 
subjects.  Meanwhile, some are exposed to loosing their 
economics panache, after being influenced by Fiqh 
methodology.  Most of them however, may be able to survive in 
their own field without making much of a dent in the other 
field.  Shari'a scholars meanwhile would rarely be able to 
venture into the field of economics, due to their textual 
training.  They are much luckier as they are less tempted to go 
astray.   
We can therefore advise economists who work with Islamic  
economics to formulate their economist perspective of Shari'a 
rules in the subjects they deal with, leaving the final opinion 
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to Fiqh scholars.  Their economist perspective of Fiqh would 
help present interdisciplinary subjects to Fiqh scholars with a 
wider perspective.  Meanwhile, Shari'a scholars are well 
advised to formulate gradually a Fiqh perspective of the 
economic subjects related to their profession.  This would help 
them carry out a useful interdisciplinary dialogue with 
economist about the economic consequences of Fatwa, which 
they must consider before making pronouncements.  A final 
advise to the self-made Shari'a claimers to Shari'a scholarship, 
make your plan to become a real Shari'a scholar by joining a 
religious school until you get a high school diploma in Shari'a 
followed by joining a recognized Shari'a university to do 
undergraduate and graduate studies until you get a Ph D in 
Shari'a.  Then and only then, if the level of your scholarship 
allows, join Fiqh scholars. 
A. FULFILLMENT AND CHALLENGES 
Taking interest is considered a grave transgression in Islam.  
The success of Islamic finance in a freely competitive market, 
where Islamic and conventional finance each has an equal 
chance, and where Islamic finance is properly practiced, was 
postulated by “Islamic economists” a long time ago. As one 
would expect, such equal chance has been hard to come by.  
However, wherever it is available to some extent, especially in 
most Gulf countries, Islamic finance enjoys higher growth 
than conventional finance.   
Islamic finance assets in the Gulf have grown at an average 
annual rate of 30 percent during 2001-2006.  In the UAE 
alone, the average growth rate was 40 percent.  The market 
share of Islamic finance in the total assets of the finance 
industry increased from 9 percent in 2001 to 17 percent in 
2006.  It is expected to reach at least one third by 2010. 
Had Islamic finance been a fake hope or a backward ancient 
way of doing business, it would have failed right away.  Then, 
believers would have withdrawn quietly. 
However, Islamic finance faces serious challenges.  One of 
such challenges is the products of ill repute.  Such products 
can be attributed to the eagerness to provide finance products 
 8 
that can be good substitutes for conventional products.  
However, such eagerness to product substitution must be 
reined by the borderline that lies between Islamic and 
conventional finance.  Such borderline can only be defined 
with the paradigm of Islamic finance.  
B. SOURCES OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS 
Certain misconceptions that may cloud the difference between 
Islamic and conventional finance must be pointed out.  Some 
conventionally minded experts use the word “loan” to mean 
“finance.”  It must be stressed that Islamic banks provide 
finance, but they do not provide interest-based loans.  They 
may provide a limited number of interest-free loans (Qard 
Hassan) as a social service or charitable activity.  Only the 
Islamic Development Bank, IDB, provides sizable finance to its 
member governments as loans, against which it charges fees 
reflecting the actual administrative costs. 
Some use the word “Islamic bonds” to mean “Sukuk.”  
However, since bonds are interest-based debt claims, and 
since debt sale is generally against Shari’a, the term “Islamic 
bonds” would be self-contradictory. 
Sukuk are asset-based financial instruments, where non-debt 
assets compose the majority.  Debt assets in Islamic finance 
are claims resulting from Shari’a compliant sale finance. 
Some use the expression of “personal finance” to mean 
personal loans.  This only applies to conventional finance.  In 
Islamic finance, it would not be possible to provide personal 
loans on commercial basis, as lending must be done without 
charging any interest (Qard Hassan).  This may be carried out 
by Islamic banks on a limited scale as a philanthropic activity.  
Meanwhile Islamic banks can provide personal finance to 
fulfill certain personal requirements, like education, travel and 
health services.  The bank purchases such services from their 
suppliers and sells them to customers against deferred 
installments under the “service-Ijarah contract.” 
Misunderstanding has not been limited to writings but they 
extended to practice as well.  Islamic finance has its own share 
of self-claimed theorists as well as practitioners.  On the 
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theoretical side, there are those who claim scholarship in 
Shari'a without any academic training whatsoever.  Some may 
have only a first or a second university degree in Shari'a.   
A well-seasoned Shari'a scholar must be able to take a 
comparative view of all opinions involved in each subject he 
would handle.  This requires at least a Ph. D. degree in Shari'a 
from a well-known and highly accredited university.  For this 
purpose, a ranking of universities that teach Shari'a must be 
made and regularly updated.  This would make it possible to 
include Shari'a scholars with Ph D from one of the top ten or 
twenty universities in the field. 
Such requirement is often ignored by shareholders who 
appoint members in their Shari'a boards.  In addition, Shari'a 
scholars are not supposed to master the economic and 
financial side of the industry.  Each Shari'a board should 
therefore have a monetary and financial economist as a 
nonvoting advisor who would explain things from his 
perspective. 
Self-claimed experts as well as the absence of economists from 
most Shari'a scholars, have lead to the presence products of ill 
repute in Islamic finance.  Such products start in narrow 
alleys, but spread rather quickly.  They are structured outside 
the consensus of Shari’a scholars and are based on minority 
or maverick opinions signed by self-claimed but insufficiently 
qualified experts.  They expose Islamic banks to grave 
reputation risk.  They include debt based financial 
instruments circulating under the name of “Islamic bonds” 
and Sukuk, so called “hedge products” based on multiple 
promises, so called “Islamic  hedge funds”  that use dynamic 
strategies based on short sale and long purchase, as well as 
institutional Tawarruq. 
C. THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF ISLAMIC FINANCE 
Islamic finance is based on both equity and commodity trade.  
However, it does not deal in risk trading.  In place of the 
conventional loan contract, Islamic finance has a collection of 
modes of finance.  Such modes are contractual relationships 
that delineate the relationship between finance providers and 
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users. 
Equity-based modes of finance present funds to their users in 
order to provide for necessary factors of production, and/or 
working capital.  Fund owners get in return a share in profit or 
in profit and management.  No debt is created in this case. 
In commodity finance, fund users obtain the commodities they 
require for production or consumption.  Fund owners get 
mark-up, profit, or rental payments.  Commodity finance 
results in debt, either monetary or in real commodities.  Such 
debt is subject to strict rules regarding the prohibition of sale 
of debt, except at its nominal value.  The value of debt is set at 
the outset of each transaction.  Under no circumstances, it 
should be allowed to increase.  This sets it apart from 
conventional debt.         
D.  THE PRODUCT MENU  
Islamic finance uses about eleven modes of finance in place of 
the conventional loan contract.  They include  (1) Musharaka, 
(2) Diminishing Musharaka, (3) Non-Restricted Mudaraba,  (4) 
restricted Mudaraba, (5) Wakala, (6) Ijarah, (7) Ijarah 
Muntahia Bittamleek, (8) Murabaha, (9) Deferred-Payment 
Sale, (10) Istisna’, and (11) Salam2. 
Islamic finance has already passed the stage of “single mode 
transactions.”  A large number of transactions now involve 
multiple modes, e.g., Musharaka, Ijarah and Istisna’ can all be 
packaged in one product.  The art of product structuring has 
been evolving quickly.  Compared to conventional finance, 
Islamic finance provides a much richer menu of products. 
However, mixing modes of finance requires using multiple 
contracts.  This must be done with great care in order to 
remain within Shari'a compliance.  Shari'a scholars take a lot 
of care to keep certain contracts from becoming conditional on 
others and not to slip into the possibility of debt sale. 
That is why it is important that Shari'a scholars working in 
the area of finance must be highly specialized.  Academic 
training at least to the level of Ph. D. would be a minimum 
2 Appendix A gives a brief description of each mode of finance 
 11 
                                                 
requirement.  They would also need to work with a team of 
economics and financial experts, lawyers, and other 
documentation specialists. 
Differences over Islamic financial products can arise from the 
relative incompetence of Fiqh scholars, especially of those who 
lack academic credentials, ignorance of the economic 
consequences of fatwas; as such consequences must be taken 
into consideration3.  Otherwise, formal legitimacy of contracts 
may be satisfied, while legitimacy of purpose may not.  In 
addition, certain contracts may be singly lawful, but when 
mixed, they would compose a Shari'a non-compliant 
transaction. 
E. THE BENEFITS 
According to the theory of the optimum supply of money, 
developed in 1969 whose results gaining robustness overtime; 
a zero interest rate is a necessary and sufficient condition for 
the optimum allocation of resources (Pareto Optimality).  By 
using the Islamic modes of finance, spot money is never sold 
against future money and the optimality conditions stands 
inviolate.   
Islamic banking follows the pattern of universal banking, i.e., 
it mixes equity finance with commodity finance.  This is known 
in economics to reduce both the risks of moral hazard and 
adverse selection. 
Because investment deposits are not guaranteed, Islamic 
banking withstands the downturns of economic cycles much 
better than conventional banking, i.e., the former is more 
stable than the latter.  This has been discussed in some IMF 
research papers. 
Conventional finance has only one ingredient to use in 
structuring its financial products, viz., the conventional loan 
contract.  Like a potato kitchen, it is a matter of how you 
would like your potatoes: boiled, baked, fried, mashed, 
curried, etc.  Islamic finance in contrast has several modes of 
finance to use in product structuring.  The room for financial 
3 That can be attributed to the incompetence of economists advising Shari'a scholars.  
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innovation is almost limitless.  With numerous modes of 
finance, Islamic finance is haute cuisine.  Therefore, while you 
can eat almost anything in an Islamic finance kitchen, except 
for potatoes (which refers here to lending money at interest), 
the conventional finance kitchen serves only the potatoes of 
your choice. 
Islamic finance puts an accent on equity and ethical business 
(rejecting the finance of tobacco, narcotics, weapons activities 
that involve human trafficking as well production of 
distribution of material leading to social or individual harm).  
We can therefore conclude that the economist view of Islamic 
finance is that it is a system that avoids trading money for 
money.  Viewed as such, it has certain definite advantages 
when compared to conventional finance, in terms of efficiency, 
stability and risks. 
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THE PARADIGM OF ISLAMIC 
FINANCE 
Islamic finance has a certain paradigm that can be deducted 
from the system as a whole.  Such paradigm must be seriously 
considered by Shari’a scholars and Islamic economists alike as 
defining the boarders between Islamic and conventional 
finance.  The paradigm serves as a yardstick for the avoidance 
of Reba.  The main features of Islamic finance as a whole 
indicate that such features are all means to uphold the 
Qura’nic injunction against usury (Quran 2:279).  The 
Prophetic injunctions not to sell cash (spot/forward) for cash 
(forward/spot), except for equal amounts and spot delivery 
supports and emphasizes the Qura’nic injunction.   
A. THE CONCEPT OF MONEY 
Monetary economists recognize that money is unlike other 
commodities.  However, to stop treating money like any other 
commodity would require an ability to break old habits.  It is 
true that all commodities can compete with money to different 
degrees in being useful as a unit of account and a store of 
value.  Yet, only money can serve as a means of exchange.  
This should be taken as an indication that money should not 
be traded in the same way as other commodities.  However, 
this is not recognized in conventional finance, where spot 
money is traded against future money. 
It is interesting to note that Islamic finance does not treat 
money like other goods in the following manner.   
1.   The exchange of each good (including money) against 
itself (bartering) in unequal amounts is considered as a 
Reba transaction.  When there is a quality differential, 
barter is discouraged and monetary exchange is 
encouraged.  This stresses the importance of money as a 
medium of exchange.  
2.   The price of non-monetary commodities against deferred 
payment can be higher than its price against spot 
payment.  This is considered trade, which is not only 
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accepted but also religiously encouraged with blessings. 
3.   The price of present money against deferred payment 
must be strictly equal to its price against spot payment.  
Any difference would be considered Reba.   
B. PRESENT CASH IS NOT PROVIDED AGAINST FUTURE CASH 
Islamic finance follows a certain paradigm whose most 
important feature is the prohibition of selling present against 
future cash, either directly or indirectly.  This emanates from 
the insistence that money is unlike other commodities.  It can 
be exchanged against other goods, but should not be 
exchanged (spot) against itself (forward). When traded against 
itself, the whole transaction must be made spot and in equal 
amounts.  Obviously such trade would generally have no 
benefit. 
When partnership finance is involved, cash is provided against 
equity rights, which include sharing of both profit and 
management.  In Mudaraba finance, cash is provided against 
the right to share profits.  Again, cash is not given against 
cash. 
In commodity finance, present commodities are provided 
against future cash.  Alternatively, present cash is paid 
against future goods.  Goods here may include non-durables, 
durables and services usufruct. 
C. BOTH FORMAL STRUCTURE AND PURPOSE ARE CRITICAL 
FOR CONTRACT VALIDITY. 
Contracts should be formally legitimates, i.e., all formalities 
must be present.  For example, formal legitimacy of a sale 
contract may include:  
♦ The seller must own and possess the commodities.   
♦ Both the buyer and the seller must have legal 
capacity and exchange offer and acceptance.   
♦ The object of sale must be lawful.   
♦ The sale contract itself must include the goods to 
be sold, the price, the quantity, delivery and 
payment conditions.   
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♦ One of the counter values (goods or price) can be 
postponed but not both.  
♦ The act of sale must not be contingent.  
Legitimacy of purpose is also central to the validity of 
contracts.  Contracts which satisfy formal legitimacy 
conditions cannot be considered lawful if they are made for 
non-Shari'a compliant purposes.  This is especially important 
when a transaction is structured form a multiplicity of 
contracts, each of which has formal legitimacy.  However, in 
their total, they lead to illegitimate purpose, which is to sell 
money for money at a price that is not one-to-one. 
When transactions are intended to lead to certain purposes, 
they are considered void, according to Shari'a.  Some of such 
purposes include: 
♦ Payment and/or receipt of Reba, 
♦ Trading in non-lawful items, 
♦ Harming someone 
♦ Usurping people’s wealth 
Legitimacy of purpose must encompass all things that can 
realize or strengthen Maqassid al-Shari'a.  
D. REVEALED INTENTIONS ARE CONSIDERED 
As far as intentions are concerned, we can think of the 
following maxims: 
1.   Deeds are judged according to intentions. 
2.   Muslims are supposed to judge deeds not persons. 
3.   Intentions cannot be presumed, unless explicitly 
expressed.   
4.   When intentions are explicit or revealed, they must be 
considered.  
Applying the above maxims to any transaction, we can say 
that a person involved in exchange would have explicit 
intentions to get cash in two cases: 
♦ He sells commodities (goods or services) he owns 
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for cash. 
♦ He has no goods to sell, but he engages in buying 
and selling to get cash and not goods at the end.  
This is the case of Tawarruq.   
The first transaction involves getting cash in return for 
delivery of goods.  Obviously this is legitimate.   
The second case involves buying goods which the person does 
not want against deferred payment (for deferred cash) and 
then selling the same goods for spot cash.  This is what is 
claimed here to be against Shari'a. 
In the second case, exchange has no bearing on the real 
sector.  The commodity needs not move from the supplier’s 
storehouse, if resold to the same supplier.  Even when sold to 
a different supplier, aggregate demand for the goods in 
question will not have increased.   
The reason is that the first purchase against deferred payment 
registers an increase in quantity demanded and the second 
sale against spot payment registers an equal decrease in 
quantity demanded.  The only net effect happens in the money 
market, where spot money has been exchanged against future 
money, leading to an increase in debt without an equivalent 
decrease in the aggregate inventory with the suppliers of the 
same goods. 
When both contracts are placed in one transaction (purchase 
against deferred payment + sale against spot payment) we 
notice that the buyer in the first instance who is also the seller 
in the second instance has obtained spot cash against 
deferred cash.  This is the Reba that Shari'a has explicitly 
prohibited. 
In this case, the same person cannot hide his intention.  The 
fact he sells right away what he had purchased exposes him 
as cash and not commodity seeker.  When intentions cannot be 
ascertained, Muslims are supposed to judge things by 
appearance and not to speculate about intentions.  However, 
when intentions are expressed in a certain way that makes 
them obvious, they must be considered in judging the 
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legitimacy of purpose of financial contracts. 
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TAWARRUQ AS A PRODUCT OF 
ILL REPUTE 
I. INDIVIDUAL TAWARRUQ 
A. ORDINARY TAWARRUQ 
Tawarruq literally means obtaining cash or currency.  When 
cash is obtained through the liquidation of ones property of 
goods and services, it pauses no problems.  Such act can be 
termed ordinary Tawarruq which is considered lawful.  In this 
case it makes no difference whether the commodities sold had 
been purchased or acquired through other means.  The only 
requirement for ordinary Tawarruq is that it is done through 
one contract and not two or more contracts. 
B. CONTRIVED TAWARRUQ (  َﯿﺤﺘﻟا قرﻮﺘﻟاﻲﻠ )  
In this type of Tawarruq, the person is interested in getting 
cash without selling anything.  Therefore, he contrives a way 
through which he can fulfill his goals.  The concerned 
individual purchases commodities against deferred payment.  
Then he sells those commodities to obtain cash.  He may sell 
them back to the same supplier; in this case, it would be a 
two-party ‘Einah Sale.  Considering resale of commodities was 
done right after their purchase, to the same supplier and is 
admittedly done to obtain cash, such sale would be Shari'a 
non-compliant by consensus.  The reason is that the intention 
to obtain cash is not hidden; it is made explicit through the 
act of buying and then selling back to the same supplier. 
The individual may buy commodities from one supplier and 
then turns to sell them to another supplier.  This is a three-
party ‘Einah sale.  Since the intention is to get cash for cash 
and not commodities, and since such intention has been 
exposed explicitly by the act of buying then selling, it amounts 
to trading money for money and therefore involves Reba. 
It is common to say that Tawarruq and 'Einah are not the 
same.  This opinion claims that ‘'Einah involves two parties 
but Tawarruq involves three parties.  However, Dr. Sami Al-
Suwailem stresses that the Hanafi School considers Tawarruq 
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within the definition of ‘'Einah.  In addition, the Malikis take 
the same position4.  Another common but mistaken opinion is 
that the majority of Fiqh schools sanction Tawarruq.  However, 
Dr. Ali Al-Salous provides strong evidence that the stronger 
view of the Hanafi scholars that it is not allowed, while the 
Malikis disallowed it.  In addition, Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal 
considered Tawarruq as equivalent to prohibited ‘Einah5.  
Most importantly, a major figure of the Hanbali School, Imam 
Ibn Taymiyah and his well-known student, Ibn Al-Qayyem, 
have disallowed Tawarruq.  In particular, Ibn Taymiyah 
considered Tawarruq to be a sale motivated by dire need, as 
the seller purchases the merchandize against deferred 
payment and sells it at a lower price against spot payment.  
Such sale is disallowed by Shari’a.   In addition, Ibn Taymiyah 
considered Tawarruq as an artifice to use Reba, as it involves 
the sale of an amount of (deferred) cash for a lower amount of 
(spot) cash. 
Other Fiqh scholars have also disallowed Tawarruq, including 
the Khalifa Omar Ibn Abdul-Aziz and the well-known Hanafi 
scholar, Muhammad Ibn Ibrahim Al-Hassan Al-Shaibani.  
Therefore, the common impression that Tawarruq is allowed 
by most Fiqh scholars is incorrect, as the Malikis, the stronger 
opinion of the Hanafis and the dominant figures in the 
Hanbali School have all disallowed Tawarruq.  
II. INSTITUTIONAL TAWARRUQ 
A. MECHANISM: BUSINESS TO CUSTOMER 
Here we find an Islamic bank that notes the following: 
1.   There are customers who want to get present cash in 
return for debt.  Such people may be concerned about 
Shari'a compliance, but they rely on or trust the opinion 
of the Shari'a board of that bank.  They may also be 
totally unconcerned with Shari'a compliance. 
2.   Both the bank and the customer enter into an implicit 
4 Sami Al-Suwailem, “The position of old Shari'a schools from Tawarruq, “(in Arabic), 2004> 
5 Ali Al-Salous, “Tawarruq and Banking Tawarruq, “the Rabita Fiqh Academy, 2003. 
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contract through which the customer obtains an amount 
of present cash against a higher amount of future cash.  
Both the offer made by the bank and the acceptance 
made by the customer are made implicitly and not in 
writing.  Such contract is invalid according to Shari'a, as 
it explicitly involves Reba or interest.   
3.   There is an opportunity to make money twice by the 
bank.  The bank purchases commodities and then sells 
them through Murabaha or deferred-payment sale to the 
customer, gaining a markup.  Then, it sells the 
commodities as an agent to the customer either to the 
same supplier or to a different supplier, gaining an 
agency fee.  
4.   Taken individually, the Murabaha or deferred-sale 
contract, the Wakala or agency contract and the final 
spot sale contract are all valid.  However, taken together, 
the contracts are made to implement an invalid contract 
whose object is to provide present for future money. 
Such organized Tawarruq done through the intermediation of 
an individual or institution is a novelty.  Ancient Fiqh scholars 
have known such contrivance and declared it impermissible.  
Dr. Sami Al-Suwailem shows that organized Tawarruq has 
been known to Saeed Ibn Al-Musayyab, Al-Hassan Al-Bassri, 
Imam Malik Ibn Anas, and Muhammad Ibn Hassan Al-
Shaibani.  Each of those old scholars has disallowed it.    
We notice in our case above, 
♦ The customer is committing a contrived Tawarruq, 
in which his intention is explicitly exposed by virtue 
of the contracts signed with the bank.  His 
intention is to purchase an amount of present cash 
against a higher amount of future cash, in contrary 
to Shari'a explicit prohibition.  In this case he is 
committing a serious transgression. 
♦  The bank is helping and abetting a customer to 
commit a haram transaction.  In addition, the bank 
is making money through such arrangement. 
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Two things can be noted in this regard.  First, even if we were 
to believe that individual contrived Tawarruq is allowed, 
despite the revealed intention, it does not follow that 
institutional Tawarruq would be allowed6.  What applies to 
individuals does not necessarily apply to society.  Otherwise, 
we fall into the fallacy of composition.  Such fallacy can be 
likened in fiqh to Fard Kefayah, like walking in a funeral 
procession, which once some people do this, it would absolve 
the whole society.  However, this does not apply to the group. 
When no one walks in a funeral procession, every member of 
the society becomes a sinner, as this act becomes Fard Ayin.  
Therefore, if some opinions were to ignore explicitly expressed 
intentions and to consider contrived (individual) Tawarruq as 
permissible, this cannot be acceptable as a social act.   
Second, Ma’alaat, or consequences cannot be the same for the 
individual and the society.  This leads us to look into the 
consequences of the prevalence of Tawarruq. 
B. MECHANISM: BUSINESS TO BUSINESS 
Islamic banks use international commodity exchanges, and 
particularly the London Metal Exchange to place excess 
liquidity.  Sometimes, the bank takes precautions that 
include: 
♦ Dealing directly through brokers and not through 
banks 
♦ Verification of purchase of metal warrants in their 
account  
♦ Verification of ability to deliver 
In such case the bank appears to be genuinely purchasing 
metal against spot payment and selling it against deferred 
payment.  The resulting profit may be attributable to taking 
ownership of metal.  However, we mentioned above that each 
of the sale, agency and purchase contracts might be valid by 
itself.  Nonetheless, when combined together to implement an 
invalid Reba contract, they in themselves become invalid. 
6 Individual Tawarruq is considered as a Reba-based transaction by Umer Ibn Abdul Aziz, Ibn Taymiah 
and Ibn Qayem Al-Jawziyah. 
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Meanwhile, Islamic banks find it more convenient to deal 
through conventional banks as agents.  This may be more 
costly, as it involves extra bank commission in addition to 
broker’s commission.  However, the resulting debt may be 
guaranteed by the agent bank.  However, the transaction in 
this case could be reduced to a mere formality, where the 
conventional bank receives funds from an Islamic bank 
through Wakala agreement and places them in conventional 
loans, while passing an interest-rate differential to an Islamic  
bank. 
This reduces the transaction to a Tawarruq operation in which 
present money has been traded for future money.  
C. CONSEQUENCES OF INSTITUTIONAL TAWARRUQ 
Shari’a has ultimate objectives, Maqassid, that must be 
considered in making any judgement. All micro or macro 
consequences, (Ma’alaat) must be taken into consideration 
when judging something as Shari`ah compliant or not. 
The prevalence of institutional Tawarruq has serious 
implications for the treatment of debt resulting form Islamic 
commodity finance.  In addition, it has even more serious 
implications for the whole Islamic finance industry. 
D. ISLAMIC FINANCE DEBT ACQUIRING CONVENTIONAL 
CHARACTERISTICS 
One of the important distinguishing characteristics of debt 
resulting from Islamic finance is that at times of insolvency (as 
opposed to delinquency) the debtor is entitled to rescheduling 
the debt owed at no increase, not even for the administrative 
costs incurred in rescheduling.  In contrast, conventional 
finance always results in debt and at times of insolvency; the 
customer must expect penalty interest rates to be slapped over 
the debt.  Even if a conventional bank agrees to reschedule the 
debt, it would have to be done at cost, in addition to penalty. 
If Tawarruq were to be universally practiced, an insolvent 
customer would be automatically advised to arrange 
settlement through Tawarruq, which means that the debt 
would increase in value, and the bank would also make an 
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extra buck.  Islamic finance debt would then acquire some of 
the characteristics of conventional debt, like ability to increase 
over time. 
Indeed this has been happening.  In some instances, one 
Tawarruq transaction triggers another one and so on.  
Tawarruq over Tawarruq may please the financiers that abuse 
Islamic finance, as it would rid them from the obligation of 
providing free rescheduling to their insolvent customer.  
However it could become the nightmare of the whole Islamic 
finance industry. 
E. THE BLACK HOLE EFFECT 
Moreover, institutional Tawarruq is usually implemented 
through organized commodity markets, with standardized 
contracts and routine procedures.  It is not done in the local 
market, where a Muslim would be subjected to social pressure 
not to commit religious faut pas.  If it were to be considered 
lawful, Islamic financial institutions would find it much easier 
to provide their straight cash, along the pattern of 
conventional loans, rather than base their transactions upon 
Islamic modes of finance which may appear cumbersome and 
costly. 
This would turn institutional Tawarruq into a black hole in the 
in which all Islamic finance would be sucked in.  Islamic 
finance would therefore cease to exist.  Instead, we would have 
Tawarruq institutions.  Muslims would therefore engage in 
Reba-based transactions, as they would sell future cash for 
present cash.  Meanwhile, they may be lead to believe that the 
Tawarruq procedures, which amounts to using commodities as 
a camouflage and not as an object in itself, used would save 
them from the wrath of God.  This would introduce to our 
economic behavior a substantial measure of hypocrisy.  
F. MACROECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 
Islamic finance being based on provision of goods and services 
rather than money has certain benefits.  The most significant 
in this regard can be two categories of benefits: 
1.   The first benefits relate to the economy at the macro level, 
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where the practical closure of the integrated debt/money 
market and the cancellation of the role of the interest rate 
as an allocation mechanism of financial resources7.  In 
such case, the allocation of resources would be based on 
investment and production criteria rather than debt 
criteria.  People will have no incentive to economize on 
the use of money (which happens because the rate of 
interest is above zero)8.  The economy would reach 
optimal equilibrium without contriving policies to reduce 
the rate of interest to zero. 
By bringing back the money market, Tawarruq returns the 
economy to the dilemma of having a positive return on cash, 
regardless of its use.  People would have an incentive to 
economize on the use of cash in transactions and economic 
equilibrium would fall back to suboptimal. 
2.   The second benefits relate to the efficiency of the finance 
sector itself.  Conventional finance is practiced through 
the money market where spot money is traded against 
future money.  This process is subject to two major risks: 
adverse selection and moral hazard.  Such risks arise 
from information asymmetry between the more informed 
fund user and the less informed fund provider.  
Information asymmetry can be significantly reduced 
through two means.  First participation in the 
management of the fund using enterprise, through 
Musharaka would provide the fund provider with inside 
information at low cost.  Second, tying finance to specific 
uses would provide more information to fund providers 
about how funds are used.   
Islamic banking, unlike commercial but very much like 
universal banking, opens the door for partnership with fund 
7 Notice that the debt market in Islamic finance is segmented by commodities.  Each commodity has its 
own separate debt market in which the demand for such goods against deferred payment, whether through 
Murabaha or deferred-payment sale, and its supply determine the equilibrium mark-up on Murabaha or the 
equilibrium price differential on deferred-payment sale.  Such mark-up or price differential is not 
determined by the demand and supply of debt, as debt is non-negotiable.  It is rather determined by the 
demand and supply of the goods concerned against future payment.  
8 Notice here again that the premium paid is not on present against future money, but it is on goods for 
deferred payment against goods for spot payment. 
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users through Musharaka.  Moreover, Islamic finance involves 
itself in the provision of goods and services and hence in the 
use of financial resources by consumers and investors.  By its 
nature, it should be devoid of adverse selection and moral 
hazard9. 
G. THE BRIDGE BETWEEN THE REAL AND FINANCIAL SECTORS 
A major consequence of practicing mainstream Shari'a-
compatible financing modes is to tie the financial and real 
sectors together and to reduce the financial sector to size 
relative to the real sector.  Tawarruq seriously undermines 
this.  Tawarruq is just trading present for future money.  We 
can have a storehouse of goods that would never be used, 
except only as a conduit to make conventional financial 
transaction concluded through Tawarruq look Islamic.   
Tawarruq, meanwhile, removes the financial process from the 
goods market and places it back to the center of the money 
market.  It brings back the risks of adverse selection and 
moral hazard to the financial sector, thereby reducing its 
efficiency.  In addition, the little tale of the economy would 
grow back to exceed the size of the dog, exactly like what is 
happening in a conventional economy.  Now the tail can have 
fun wagging its own dog. 
Western bankers realize this dilemma and sometimes 
complain about it.  Consider Lamfalussy’s remark on this 
phenomenon during his term in the Bank of International 
Settlements, “…Our financial revolution has been accompanied 
by an accelerated growth in financial transactions without any 
detectable link with the needs of the non-financial economy.10” 
9 Risks of adverse selection and moral hazard result in conventional finance from the information 
asymmetry resulting from that the bank knows much less about the use of funds, while the customer is well 
informed, as he himself spends the loaned money.   Conventional banks would have to continuously 
monitor their customers in order to avoid such risks.  However, monitoring is usually resisted or dodged by 
customers and is rather costly to banks.  Universal banks that practice equity finance (Musharaka) side-by-
side with lending are better equipped to monitor their corporate customers by setting on their boards.  In 
Islamic finance, cash is given to customers only in cases of partnership finance, when full monitoring is 
available.  In sale finance, the bank directly provides goods and services to its customer, thereby leaving no 
room to use the funds for other purposes.   
10 Alexandre Lamfalussy, general manager, BIS, “The Restructuring of the Financial Industry: A central 
Banking Perspective”, SUERF Lecture, City University, London, 5 March 1992. 
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We can therefore conclude that Tawarruq effectively removes 
one of the major benefits of Islamic finance, which is to have a 
strong, two-way, bridge between the real and financial sector. 
III. SOME SIDE ISSUES  
A. PARALLELISM BETWEEN MURABAHA AND TAWARRUQ 
The claim of parallelism between Murabaha and Tawarruq 
lacks reasoned justification.  Murabaha is a legitimate mode of 
Islamic finance.  It places goods and services (not cash) in the 
hands of banks’ customers.  It was criticized as bearing 
similitude to the classical loan.  In addition, it requires a 
number of legal actions that must be taken in the proper 
order.  If not, it loses Shari’a compliance.  The practice of 
Murabaha has helped the Islamic finance industry to survive 
for some time until innovation has brought forward a large 
number of products that helped Islamic banks to diversify 
their assets.  Now, the justification of predominance of 
Murabaha is getting weaker. 
In addition, if an intention to use Murabaha is revealed by a 
particular customer, the Islamic bank should refuse to provide 
him with such finance.  Such intention can be discovered 
through repeated use of goods Murabaha, or blowing the 
whistle by someone else in the market.  
In comparison, Murabaha finance, where goods are sought for 
themselves and not cash, reduces suppliers’ inventories and 
increases the quantity demanded of the same goods.  When 
such trend persists (people tend to purchase the same goods 
using Murabaha finance, an increase in the price of goods (in 
the real sector) and markup (in the finance sector) thereupon 
would rise. 
In the case of Tawarruq, no effects on the real sector, while the 
financial sector would charge higher price differential on 
deferred-payment sale.  This is a purely monetary change with 
no real counterpart.  This makes it a disguised rise in the rate 
of interest.    
B.    TAWARRUQ AS AN ARTIFICE: 
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An artifice is a pretense or ploy.  Institutional Tawarruq is an 
artifice in that sense.  An artifice could imply deception, deceit 
or cunning.  However, institutional tawarruq may not involve 
that, unless we mean self-deception.  It involves the deceit of 
others to the extent that the majority of people are laymen 
when it comes to Fiqh.  In addition, many would assume that 
everything practiced by an Islamic financial institution must 
be legitimate, especially if Tawarruq is provided under a nice 
name. 
C. ISLAMIC BANKS OPERATING AT SECOND LEVEL  
Some people may justify Tawarruq and other products of ill 
repute as transitory.  The argument starts with postulating 
that Islamic finance is a new industry.  It cannot therefore 
apply fully its paradigm from the very beginning.  It must start 
at second level (perhaps what is meant is the basement) before 
moving higher. 
Transitory modes of operations can be temporarily tolerated, 
provided that: 
♦ The transaction itself should not be declared 
Shari'a-compliant.  Shari'a non-compliance should 
be admitted at the outset.  Justification could 
follow for reasons of dire necessity or darura.   
♦ Permission to carry out such transactions should 
be obtained from the Shari'a board on a case-by-
case basis. 
♦ The use of such transaction should be considered 
temporary, which would make it subject to review 
periodically.  
Second-level operations (or rather basement products) should 
never be declared Shari’a compatible.  Only temporary 
tolerance is allowed as an exemption.  In addition, in order to 
ascertain dire necessity, there must not be any viable 
alternative to the exempted unlawful transaction. 
The case of institutional tawarruq does not involve the 
admission of some Shari`ah incompatible aspects while 
working on their gradual removal.  It rather involves claiming 
 28 
that tawarruq is lawful and the practicing bank is already 
using first-best solutions.  In addition, almost all Islamic 
modes of finance can be used in place of Tawarruq.  When 
lawful alternatives are present, exemptions become 
unjustified. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
We can conclude from above the following: 
First, Islamic finance has an approach that is uniquely 
different from the conventional approach.  In addition, Islamic 
finance leads to real gains both to the economy as a whole and 
to the financial sector in particular. 
Second, the Islamic finance industry has come of age and is 
capable of competition if a plain-level field is assured.  This is 
what is happening gradually in the Gulf area.  
Third, the Islamic finance industry is suffering from lack of 
human resources with the right knowledge and experience.  It 
is also suffering from self-claimed yet hardly qualified Shari’a 
experts who have no credentials to deserve to be called Shari’a 
scholars. The existence of this group, coupled with the 
negligence of some Shari’a scholars of the economic 
consequences of their Fatwa, has lead to sneaking some 
products of ill repute into the Islamic finance industry. 
Fourth, Tawarruq is one of the most dangerous among the 
products of ill repute, for it threatens the future of Islamic 
finance. 
Fifth, the common impression that individual Tawarruq has 
been sanctioned by a majority of Fiqh scholars is a common 
mistake that has been perpetuated by one of the rate careless 
passages of the Kuwaiti Fiqh Encyclopedia.  The fact is that 
Fiqh consensus has been to consider Tawarruq as 'Einah, 
which is strongly prohibited.  
Sixth, contrary to the common impression, organized 
Tawarruq was known to old scholars and was considered by 
them as ‘'Einah, which they disallowed. 
Seventh, the banking regulatory authorities are strongly 
invited to set standards for the corporate governance of Fatwa 
and Shari’a Supervisory Boards in Islamic banks.  In 
particular, such standards must require a Ph D in Shari'a 
from a well-known university for Shari'a scholars to qualify for 
board membership.  In addition, the standards must envisage 
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at least one monetary and financial economist with a Ph D in 
his field as a none-voting member of such boards. 
Eighth, a ranking of universities teaching Shari'a must be 
done and updated regularly as a guide to ascertain the 
qualifications of Shari'a scholars.  
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APPENDIX A: A BRIEF LIST OF 
ISLAMIC FINANCIAL 
PRODUCTS 
Islamic financial products can be simple or complex.  Simple 
products are based on a single mode of finance, while complex 
products are structured using multiple modes of finance. 
The following list does not intend to provide the reader with a 
comprehensive menu of Islamic financial products, but merely 
intend to give the reader a taste of the variety and multiplicity 
of such menu. 
I. SIMPLE PRODUCTS OF ISLAMIC FINANCE  
A. PARTNERSHIP PRODUCTS 
1.   MUSHARAKA 
1.1 In Musharaka, both parties share in capital and 
management.   
1.2 Permanent Musharaka is exactly similar to equity 
finance. 
1.3 Diminishing Musharaka stipulates providing funds for a 
limited number of years, during which a part of the 
partner’s profit is used to buy out the share of the finance 
provider. 
1.4 Equity finance can make the bank a permanent 
shareholder, to exit only through the sale of its share in 
the stock market or OTC.  
2.   DIMINISHING MUSHARAKA  
2.1 In diminishing Musharaka, the bank exits within a 
specified number of years.   
3.   MUDARABA 
3.1 In Mudaraba, the bank provides capital and the 
entrepreneur provides management.  Profit is shared in a 
preagreed formula. It is usually used to finance working 
capital requirements for medium-term periods.  It 
requires monitoring, whose cost is reduced when both 
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Musharaka and Mudaraba are used simultaneously.   
4.   UNRESTRICTED MUDARABA 
4.1 Mudaraba can be either restricted or non-restricted.  
4.2 Unrestricted Mudaraba allows the bank to provide the 
customer with working capital that can be used in all 
aspects of the customer’s business.  Profit is shared in 
pre-agreed ratios, but loss must be shared 
proportionately. 
5.   RESTRICTED MUDARABA 
5.1 The bank provides funds to invest under certain 
restrictions, which can be positive or negative.  
5.2 Positive restrictions would list all allowable investment 
outlets in which the funds provided can be used. 
5.3  Negative restrictions would list all the investment outlets 
in which the customer is prohibited from using the funds. 
B. PRODUCTS BASED ON SALE FINANCE 
6.   DEFERRED-PAYMENT SALE 
6.1 In deferred-payment sale, the bank already owns the 
goods.   
6.2 A price is negotiated without reference to cost that would 
entail deferred payment in lump sum or installments 
7.   Murabaha 
7.1 In Murabaha, the customer signs a promise to buy the 
goods on installments at cost plus markup.  The bank 
acquires the goods and sells them to the customer as 
promised 
7.2 Murabaha can be used to finance raw materials, 
consumer goods or fixed assets, although it is used more 
often in car finance.   
8.   SALAM 
8.1 Salam can be used to finance working capital.  The bank 
purchases a quantity of future output and pays spot.  
The customer delivers later.  The bank can sell the same 
products through parallel Istisna’, or appoint the 
customer as its agent to sell them at time of delivery. 
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8.2 In Salam, the buyer finances the seller which is just the 
opposite of Murabaha and deferred-payment sale.  It can 
also be used as a means to secure future commodity/raw 
material requirements for business enterprises at given 
prices (product finance).  This provides a hedge against 
future price changes.  
9.   ISTISNA’ 
9.1 In Istisna’, the assets are not existent at the time.  The 
bank signs an Istisna’ contract.  Such contract 
commands the bank to build or manufacture the asset 
according to detailed specifications.  In order to fulfill its 
obligations, the bank signs a parallel Istisna’ contract 
with the manufacturer to do the same. 
9.2 Payment in Istisna’ contract (by the customer) could 
range between 5 and 15 years.  Payment to manufacturer 
or builder is done at specified stages and upon the 
completion of each stage. 
9.3 While in Murabaha and deferred-payment sale, the seller 
finances the buyer.  Meanwhile, in ISTISNA’   either party 
may finance the other (according to Intl Fiqh Academy 
ruling and some schools of jurists). 
 
C. IJARAH FINANCE 
10.   REGULAR IJARAH 
10.1 This is used to finance the use of durable assets, as in 
home finance, and in the finance of plant, equipment and 
means of transport (airplanes, ships, etc.) 
10.2 The bank leases the assets with a permission to 
sublease.  The bank then leases the assets to its 
customer against regular rental payments. 
10.3 In this case, the customer is interested only in the 
usufruct and not in title transfer. 
11.   IJARAH MUNTAHIA BITTAMLEEK 
11.1 The bank acquires the assets and then leases them to the 
customer with a promise to transfer full ownership to 
customer by way of gift or selling them to customer at a 
 34 
token price, provided he fulfills all obligations.  
11.2 Ijarah Muntahia Bittamleek is typically an intermediate 
to long-term finance.  It could go up to 15 or 20 years.  
Ordinary Ijarah that does not involve title transfer is 
typically a short-term finance that ranges from one to five 
years. 
12.   WAKALA 
12.1 The bank can provide the customer funds to be used in a 
specific investment outlet.   
12.2 The customer would be acting as an agent of the bank. 
12.3 The bank obtains all the profit and bears all the losses. 
12.4 The customer gets a fixed commission to compensate for 
his efforts. 
II. COMPLEX (STRUCTURED) ISLAMIC 
FINANCE PRODUCTS  
The number of complex Islamic finance product enormous and 
cannot be listed.  With 12 modes of finance to use as raw 
material, which would be mixed in different ways and different 
proportions, combinations can amount to hundreds.  However, 
using multiple modes of finance in one transaction is 
tantamount to using multiple contracts.  This requires 
acumen in both Shari'a and law.  The art of product 
structuring has been made less tedious by using multi-
disciplinary teams of Shari'a, finance and law experts to do the 
job. 
III. OTHER PRODUCTS 
13.   MUTUAL FUNDS SHARES 
13.1 Islamic banks and finance institutions structure funds 
for purposes similar to those of conventional funds.  The 
mixture of liquidity, security and return is measured to 
suit the requirements of fund shareholders.  However, the 
fund must be structured to be Shari’a compatible.   
13.2 Islamic funds based on Ijarah dealing in high growth 
sectors like real estate earn high rates of return, but the 
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risk is also high.   
13.3 Funds based on shares can become victims of stock 
markets idiosyncrasies.  Each Islamic bank in the UAE 
has some high-profile funds in addition to marketing 
funds structured by conventional and/or Islamic banks 
and financial institutions. 
13.4 Like conventional funds. An SPV is constructed to mange 
the fund.  The brochure, prospectus and other 
documents must be approved by the bank’s Shari’a 
Board.  It is also subjected to Shari’a auditing.   
13.5 Most funds created are managed by SPV’s located in tax 
havens.  Bahrain and the International Financial Market 
in Dubai are increasingly attracting fund managers.  
Fund assets must be evaluated regularly (usually 
quarterly) for profit distribution.  Islamic banks in the 
UAE have become quite familiar with the process of 
distributing roles related to fund establishment and 
management among themselves. 
14.   SUKUK 
Sukuk are created through several steps.  First banks acquire 
real assets and bunch them in a Shari’a compatible fashion.  
They are sold in a bunch to an SPV.  Credit enhancement, 
promotion, underwriting and marketing is done in a fashion 
similar to conventional securities.  The SPV manages the 
underlying assets for the interest of shareholders.  It 
distributes its net profit to Sukuk holders in proportion to 
their holding. 
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